











There	 is	 a	 rich	 body	 of	 work	 in	 critical	 race	 and	 feminist	 theories	 that	 have	 criticised	 as	
Euro/Anglo‐centric,	and	hence	exclusionary,	 the	 liberal	 foundations	of	Western	democratic	
legal	systems.	The	basis	of	such	critiques	is	that	legal	personhood	is	premised	on	an	atomistic	
individual	 agent	 that	 purports	 to	 be	 neutral	 but	 in	 actuality	 reflects	 and	 maintains	 the	
hegemonic	gendered	and	raced	status	quo	privileging	the	white,	middle	to	upper‐class	man	
to	 the	 exclusion	 of	 women	 and	 all	 racial	 and	 cultural	 Others.	 Some	 approaches,	 such	 as	
cultural	 defences	 in	 criminal	 law,	 have	 sought	 to	 address	 this	 via	 a	 recognition	 and	
incorporation	of	the	difference	of	Other	groups	and	their	different	moral	norms,	proclivities	
and	 circumstances.	 To	 illustrate,	 this	 discussion	 will	 draw	 on	 a	 cultural	 defence	 that	 was	
advanced	 in	 a	 series	 of	 group	 sexual	 violence	 cases	 that	 involved	 four	 Pakistani,	 Muslim	
brothers.	While	concluding	that	culture	permeates	the	actions	of	all	 individuals,	 this	article	
seeks	 to	 show	 how	 cultural	 recognition	 approaches	 in	 law	 often	 overlook	 the	 individual	
agency	of	 those	differentiated	through	their	racial,	ethnic	and	religious	visibility.	Instead	of	
asserting	 the	 primacy	 of	 individual	 free	 will	 and	 a	 rational	 agent	 as	 the	 main	 driver	 of	
criminal	behaviour	cultural	defences,	in	particular,	appear	to	attribute	criminal	action	to	the	






















culture	 raised	 throughout	 the	 brothers’	 trials,	 and	 a	 cultural	 defence	 raised	 in	 a	 sentencing	
appeal	for	the	ringleader,	this	discussion	contends	that	an	Anglo	or	Euro‐centric	legal	system’s	
understanding	 of	 Other	 cultures	 represents	 a	 departure	 from	 its	 liberal	 philosophical	
underpinnings	 that	 are	 founded	 on	 individualism,	 free	 will,	 and	 rationality	 –	 the	 tenets	 of	
liberalism	 that	 have	 long	 been	 critiqued	 by	 feminists	 and	 critical	 race	 theorists	 as	 highly	
gendered	 and	 racialised	 despite	 being	 posited	 as	 neutral	 (see	 Delgado	 and	 Stefancic	 2000;	
Naffine	 1987;	 1990;	 Razack	 1999;	 Threadgold	 1991).	 By	 drawing	 on	 the	 insights	 of	 critical	
theory,	this	paper	argues	that	liberalism’s	central	tenet	of	the	individual	free	agent	seems	to	be	
superseded	 by	 law’s	 invocations	 of	 Other	 cultures,	 becoming	 markedly	 lost	 within	 cultural	
defence	arguments	in	criminal	law	(Volpp	2001).	Instead	of	asserting	the	primacy	of	individual	
free	 will	 and	 a	 rational	 volitional	 subject	 as	 the	 main	 driver	 of	 criminal	 behaviour,	 cultural	





of	 culture	 might	 be	 advanced	 in	 adversarial	 legal	 frameworks	 with	 progressive	 intent,	 such	




move	 beyond	 the	 reductive	 and	 objectifying	 projects	 of	 colonialism	 and	 conservative	 politics	
which	presuppose	the	moral	superiority	of	hegemonic	Western	cultures	(Narayan	1998,	2000).	
Indeed,	when	 the	 culture	of	Others	 is	 deployed	as	part	of	 an	 explanation	or	 as	mitigation	 for	




on	 representations	 of	 Others	 as	 bound	 to	 the	 dictates	 of	 backward	 and	 intransigent	 cultural	
practices.	 As	 seen	 in	 the	 case	 study	 on	 which	 this	 paper	 focuses,	 sexual	 violence	 cases	 also	















to	 age	 or	mental	 illness,	 are	 in	 effect	 cultural.	 Examples	may	 be	 found	 in	 legal	 scripts	where	
accused	persons	are	attributed	positive	character	traits	such	as	achievements	in	education	and	
professional	life	(such	as	an	example	of	educational	achievement	under	adverse	circumstances	
as	 cited	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 youngest	 of	 the	 K	 brothers)	 or	 are	 generally	 and	 generically	










group	 sexual	 assaults	 on	 several	 young	 women	 throughout	 2002	 and	 were	 reported	 by	
mainstream	media	to	exclusively	attack	young	white	Australian	women.	The	theme	of	racialised	
sexual	 assault	 echoed	popular	 and	political	discourse	 around	 the	 cases,	 trials	 and	 sentencing,	
between	 2000	 and	 2006,	 for	 a	 series	 of	 other	 group	 sexual	 assaults	 involving	 two	 separate	
groups	 of	 young	 Lebanese	 Muslim	 perpetrators	 who	 were	 also	 seen	 to	 target	 young	 white	
Australian	 women.	 Popularly	 labeled	 as	 the	 ‘Sydney	 gang	 rapes’,	 the	 trilogy	 of	 group	 sexual	
assault	 cases	 included	 AEM	 and	 Others,	 Bilal	 Skaf	 and	 his	 cohorts,	 and	 ended	 with	 the	 K	
brothers’	attacks.	These	other	cases	comprised	part	of	the	general	social	and	political	backdrop	
in	 which	 the	 K	 brothers’	 trials	 took	 place.	 These	 incidences	 of	 group	 sexual	 violence	 were	
ubiquitously	racialised	in	public	discourse	–	with	Middle	Eastern	Muslim	men	attacking	white	






Despite	 the	 political	 racket,	 legal	 discourses	 around	 the	 cultural	 backgrounds	 of	 the	
perpetrators	in	all	three	cases	were	typically	subdued	on	the	issue	of	race,	ethnicity	and	culture	
(terms	 interchangeably	 used),	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 the	 K	 brothers’	 trials	 where	 the	 most	
striking	and	problematic	 references	 to	 culture	 emerged	 in	 the	 form	of	 a	 cultural	 defence	 in	 a	
sentencing	appeal	that	sought	to	explain	the	ringleader’s	violent	misogyny	through	reference	to	
his	 cultural	 background.	 In	 fact,	 cultural	 defences	 used	 to	 mitigate	 gendered	 violence	 are	
unremarkable	and	have	featured	in	American	(Okin	1999;	Renteln	2004;	Volpp	2001),	English	
(Phillips	 2003)	 and	 Australian	 courts	 (Maher	 et	 al.	 2005),	 particularly	 with	 reference	 to	
provocation	 cases	where	men	 have	 killed	 their	 estranged	 or	 unfaithful	 partners.	 Yet	 all	 have	






documents,	which	 engage	with	 the	 concept	 of	 culture.	 Concluding	 that	 culture	permeates	 the	
actions	of	all	 individuals	–	along	with	 the	structural	circumstances	 in	which	cultural	practices	
and	 individual	 choices	 are	 realised	 –	 this	 discussion	 ultimately	 seeks	 to	 show	 how	 cultural	




essentialist	scripts	 that	currently	appear	 to	characterise	 legal	and	 judicial	musings	on	culture.	
These	suggestions	do	not	preclude	recognition	of	the	fact	that	sexual	violence	and	generalised	
misogyny	 is	 indeed	a	distinctly	 cultural	problem	among	men	acting	 in	groups	within	different	





three	 separate	 group	 sexual	 assaults	 perpetrated	 on	 four	 young	 women.2	 This	 group	 of	










The	 attacks	 occurred	 in	 a	 unit	 in	 a	 Sydney	 suburb	 over	 a	 six‐month	 period	 during	 2002,	
involving	considerable	violence	and	threats	with	offensive	weapons.	During	the	trials	for	these	
rapes,	the	court	heard	that	the	four	brothers	and	RS	often	befriended	a	number	of	young	women	








their	 barristers	 for	 the	 first	 few	 trials,	 and	 steadfastly	 refuse	 legal	 representation	 while	
expressing	a	preference	 to	 represent	 themselves.	Their	 reasoning	was	based	on	 the	brothers’	
allegations	 that	 the	 Australian	 government,	 police,	 and	 the	 courts	 were	 complicit	 in	 an	 anti‐
Muslim	 conspiracy	 against	 them.	 MSK	 specifically	 accused	 their	 barrister	 of	 saying	 that	 ‘all	
Muslims	 are	 rapists’	 and	 that	 they	 were	 subsequently	 forced	 to	 sack	 him.	 The	 brothers’	
allegations	were	followed	by	a	sensational	sequence	of	events	in	court,	owing	to	the	outlandish	
and	 unchecked	 courtroom	 behaviour	 of	 the	 self‐represented	 accused,	 led	 by	 MSK,	 which	
resulted	in	stays	to	the	legal	process,	aborted	trials,	retrials	and	numerous	appeals.		
	
The	 oldest	 brothers’	 courtroom	 histrionics	 occurred	 in	 the	 two	 separate	 trials	 conducted	 for	
three	 separate	 attacks:	 one	 for	 the	 first	 two	 victims	 that	 came	 forward,	 LS	 and	 HG	 (whose	
names	were	subject	to	a	media	suppression	order),	before	Justice	Brian	Sully;	and	another	for	
the	 second	 two	 victims	 (who	 famously	 waived	 their	 right	 to	 anonymity,	 Tegan	Wagner	 and	
Cassie	Hamim),	before	Justice	Hidden	some	three	years	later.	The	well‐publicised	delay	tactics	










Perhaps	 the	 allegations	 of	 racism	 and	 the	 brothers’	 dramatic	 displays	 in	 court	 provided	
foundations	 for	 the	 distinctly	 cultural	 overtones	 of	 public	 narratives	 that	 racialised	 the	 K	
brothers’	courtroom	misbehaviour,	providing	some	credibility	to	 ideas	that	they	obeyed	 ‘alien	




legal	 actors	 empowered	 them	 to	 advance	 extremely	 problematic	 and	 highly	 gendered	 and	
racialised	understandings	of	their	cultural	background.	Yet,	despite	their	cultural	difference,	the	
K	family’s	pronouncements	on	their	own	cultural	background	exhibited	striking	similarities	to	













Comments	 such	as	 these	echoed	 the	 sharp	division	 that	had	been	constructed	along	 religious	
and	 racial	 lines,	 particularly	with	 popular	 political	 discourse	 around	 the	 preceding	 racialised	
gang	 rape	 cases,	 between	Western	 culture	 (invisible	 in	 its	 hegemony)	 and	 Muslim	 minority	
cultures.	Indeed,	the	sentiment	outside	the	rarefied	space	of	the	courtroom	could	be	summed	up	




Such	 cultural	 schisms	 constructed	 in	 popular	 narratives	 outside	 the	 courtroom,	 and	by	 the	K	
family	 themselves,	 were	 reinforced	 within	 the	 courtroom	 by	 an	 intersection	 of	 legal,	
anthropological,	 psychological	 and	 medical	 discourses	 that	 sought	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 K	




a	 ‘cultural	 time	 bomb’	 waiting	 to	 explode	 (Odgers	 2005).	 Drawing	 on	 independent	




of	 the	 sentences	 handed	 down	 by	 Justice	 Brian	 Sully	 in	 the	 earlier	 trial	 for	 the	 K	 brothers’	
attacks	on	LS	and	HG.		
	
The	 defence	 was	 supported	 by	 an	 expert	 witness,	 Professor	 Michael	 Humphrey,	 who	 had	
researched	the	tribal	culture	of	North	West	Frontier	Pakistan	(NWFP),	an	anomic	space	at	the	
border	 of	 Afghanistan	 that	 is	 marked	 by	 poverty	 and	 conflict	 (Abbas	 2014),	 where	 the	 K	
brothers	were	 born	and	lived	 for	most	 of	 their	lives	(Odgers	2005).	Aspects	of	the	culture	that	
Humphrey	described	were	that:	
	
[It	 is]	 a	 tribal	 culture	 with	 strong	 patriarchal	 values	 and	 an	 honour	 code	
enforced	 by	personal	violence	 …	 Men	 have	 control	 over	 women	 in	 all	 areas	
of	 their	 lives;	 men’s	 authority	 over	women	 is	 reinforced	 by	 the	 legal	 system	
[and]	rape	is	a	crime	that	 is	prosecuted	rarely.	(Odgers	2005:	6)	
	
Elsewhere,	Odgers	quoted	Humphrey’s	arguments	 that	 the	 factual	 circumstances	 in	which	 the	
offender	 found	 himself	would,	 in	 NWFP	 ‘almost	 certainly	 be	 found	 in	 a	 brothel’	 and	 that	 the	
‘proposition	 that	 a	 girl	 in	 this	 situation	 could	 take	 control	 by	 asserting	 her	 rights	 –	 i.e.	
saying	 no	 –	 would	 be	 very	 difficult	 in	 a	patriarchal	tribal	culture	where	women	are	treated	
as	dependants	and	legal	minors’	(2005:	7).	 	
	
In	sum,	the	substance	 of	 the	 submissions	 were	 that	 the	 offender	 ‘ by	 reason	 of	 this	cultural	
background,	 did	 not	 appreciate,	 or	 did	 not	 fully	 appreciate,	 the	 wrongness	 and	criminality	
of	 his	 actions’,	 and	 that	 this,	 to	 an	 extent,	 diminished	 the	 culpability	 of	 the	accused	 (Odgers	
2005:	6).	These	statements	were	enthusiastically	supported	by	MSK	himself:		
	
[TW]	 said	 no	 but	 I	 go	 ahead	 with	 it	 because	 I	 believe	 that	 at	 the	 time	 I	
commit	 these	offences,	 I	 believe	 that	 she	 was	 promiscuous	…	 She	 don't	 know	
us,	 I	 don't	 know	 her	 …	 she	 was	 not	 wearing	 any	 headscarf	 and	 she	 started	








racialisation	 of	 sexual	 assault	 at	 the	 time,	 even	 though	 they	 were	 advanced	 with	 what	 was	
presumably	 the	politically	 progressive	 intent	 of	 cross‐cultural	 recognition	 in	 order	 to	 explain	
the	attitudes	behind	 the	attacks,	partially	absolve	MSK	of	 individual	moral	 responsibility	 and,	
ultimately,	secure	a	more	lenient	sentence.	
	
In	his	 sentencing	 judgment	of	2006,	 Justice	Hidden	gave	serious	consideration	 to	 the	cultural	
factors	 raised	 by	 Professor	 Humphrey’s	 anthropological	 evidence	 about	 NWFP.	 His	 Honour	
noted	 the	 Crown’s	 objection	 to	 the	 Professor’s	 evidence	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 generality:	 ‘He	 [the	
Crown]	accepted	that	 the	Professor	was	qualified	 to	speak	of	 the	social	mores	of	 the	relevant	
area	of	Pakistan	but	noted	that	he	had	never	interviewed	the	offender	and	was	unaware	of	his	








for	 his	 offences,	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 he	 thought	 prosecution	 of	 his	 offences	was	 ludicrous	 (and	
therefore	 part	 of	 an	 anti‐Muslim	 conspiracy),	 Justice	 Hidden	 deferred	 again	 to	 Humphrey’s	
evidence:	
	
Professor	 Humphrey	 sketched	 briefly	 how	 men’s	 authority	 over	 women	 is	
reinforced	by	the	legal	system,	including	areas	of	the	criminal	law	which	make	it	





to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 very	 same	 issues	 around	 the	 prosecution	 of	 gendered	 violence	 still	 also	
plague	Western	criminal	justice	systems.	In	the	end,	Justice	Hidden	rejected	the	cultural	defence	
on	 the	 basis	 that	 MSK	 had	 been	 in	 Australia	 long	 enough	 to	 be	 habituated	 to	 its	 dominant	
cultural	 norms	 (thereby	 constructing	Australia	 as	 a	 non‐patriarchal	 society	where	 sexual	 and	
gendered	violence	does	not	 tend	 to	occur	 in	 similar	 circumstances);	but	he	did	not	 reject	 the	
defence	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 its	 generality	 or	 for	 its	 reliance	 on	 limited	 or	 overly	 simplified	
understandings	of	culture	and	cultural	difference.		
	
Moreover,	 Justice	 Hidden’s	 musings	 on	 MSK’s	 cultural	 background	 yield	 some	 interesting	
insights	into	the	way	Euro/Anglo‐centric	legal	discourses	–	usually	committed	to	liberal	ideas	of	
individual	 responsibility	 and	 freewill	 as	 exercised	 by	 rational	 men	 –	 appears	 to	 bestow	 or	
retrieve	individual	agency	from	accused	persons	who	are	viewed	as	culturally	‘Other’.	Here,	the	
ability	 to	 act	 as	 a	 rational	 free	 agent	 appears	 to	 be	 dependent	 on	whether	 an	 individual	 acts	
within	the	dominant	normative	cultural	framework,	an	invisible	culture	that	ostensibly	does	not	
influence	 its	 members	 to	 act	 in	 morally	 abhorrent	 ways	 that	 target	 vulnerable	 members	 of	
society.	To	the	extent	that	racially	 ‘unmarked’	 individuals	morally	transgress,	they	are	seen	to	
either	 choose	 their	 transgressions	 from	 established	 moral	 norms,	 or	 their	 actions	 are	
interpreted	as	the	result	of	 individual	pathologies.	The	inverse	appears	to	be	applied	by	some	
legal	actors	to	the	criminal	actions	of	cultural	Others.	Try	as	they	might,	the	criminal(ised)	Other	








Hence,	Hidden’s	 entertainment	 of	 the	 idea	 that	MSK’s	 culture	was	 responsible	 for	 his	 violent	
misogyny	was	only	outweighed	by	the	idea	that	he	must	by	now	be	sufficiently	enculturated	to	
be	 an	 individual	moral	 agent	 of	 the	 dominant	 culture	 and	 act	 on	 his	 own	 free	 will.	 In	 other	
words,	His	Honour	presumes	that	MSK	should,	after	a	few	years	in	Australia,	have	the	ability	to	
depart	 from	 the	 deterministic	 clutches	 of	 his	 cultural	 background	 that	 dictates	 highly	
patriarchal	 and	 misogynistic	 norms	 through	 which	 women	 are	 dehumanised.	 This	 sort	 of	
judicial	reasoning	operates	on	the	liberal	philosophy	that	underpins	law:	Kant’s	rational	moral	
agent	 ‘who	 is	 free	only	 insofar	 as	 he	 can	 act	 in	 accordance	with	 a	universal	 law	 that	 he,	 as	 a	
rational	 being,	 legislates	 to	 himself’	 (Benhabib	 2002:	 139).	 Outside	 the	 courtroom,	 in	 the	
domain	of	popular	media	and	conservative	political	 commentary	(which	 invariably	seeps	 into	
legal	 discourse),	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 an	 oscillation	 between	 the	 bestowal	 of	 individual	 and	
collective	 (cultural)	 responsibility.	 While	 deviant	 actions	 are	 attributed	 to	 culture,	 the	
possibility	 that	 this	 may	 serve	 as	 mitigation	 for	 criminal	 behaviour	 often	 results	 in	 calls	 for	
cultural	Others	to	be	treated	like	‘everyone	else’	and	punished	with	the	full	weight	of	the	law.		
	
Justice	Hidden’s	 approach	may	be	 contrasted	 to	 other	 judicial	 actors	 in	 the	K	brothers’	 cases	
who	 refused	 to	 consider	 arguments	 around	 cultural	 conditioning.	 In	 an	 earlier	 sentencing	
appeal	 at	 the	 end	of	 2005	against	 Justice	 Sully’s	 sentences,	 the	 expert	 testimony	of	 Professor	
Humphrey	 had	 not	 yet	 been	 made	 available	 by	 defence	 counsel.	 At	 that	 stage,	 the	 defence	
submissions	relied	simply	on	the	argument	that	MSK	held	‘very	traditional	views	about	women’	
because	of	his	cultural	conditioning	in	Pakistani	society	(Regina	v	MAK,	Regina	v	MSK,	Regina	v	
MMK	 [2005]	NSWCCA	369).	 Such	 submissions	were	 firmly	 rejected	by	 the	 Justices	McClellan,	




Whatever	 counsel	 implied	 by	 his	 expression	 ‘traditional	 views	 about	 women’,	
neither	is	there	to	be	extracted	some	element	of	mitigation.	If	it	was	intended	to	
suggest	 that	 differences	 might	 be	 observed	 in	 behaviour	 in	 the	 respective	
‘cultures’	of	Pakistan	and	Australia,	 there	was,	and	 is,	not	the	slightest	basis	 for	
concluding	other	than	that	in	both	places,	all	women	are	entitled	to	respect	and	





insult’	 (at	 61).	 The	 views	 of	 these	 judges	 seem	 to	 remain	 faithful	 to	 the	 law’s	 privileging	 of	





not	Pakistani	 culture,	 then	 ‘foreign’	 or	Other	 cultures	 in	 general.	 Aside	 from	 the	 commentary	
and	behaviours	of	the	brothers	and	their	families	that	were	upheld	by	popular	media	narratives	






be	 useful	 to	 know	 about	 any	 prevalent	 cultural	 assumptions	 and	 practices	
relating	 to	 females	 that	 they	may	have	absorbed	during	 their	 formative	years	–	









to	 sex	 offenders	 from	 any	 ethnic	 background.	 Despite	 his	 consideration	 of	 such	 expert	




and	 everywhere	 a	 base	 act	 and	 a	 major	 crime.	 It	 is	 not,	 ever	 or	 anywhere,	 a	
defence	 that	 the	 woman	 was	 flighty,	 flirtatious	 or	 simply	 foolish.	 That	 latter	







more	 prevalent	 within	 ‘foreign	 ethnic	 cultures’	 and	 not	 ‘our	 society’.	 His	 remark	 suggests	 a	
certain	 backwardness	 in	 respecting	 women’s	 rights	 associated	 with	 specific	 cultures	 that	 is	
apparently	not	at	all	applicable	to	Australia,	presenting	a	homogenous	view	of	both	Australian	
society	and	the	culture	of	‘foreign	countries’.	It	may	be	true	that	the	culture	of	NWFP	is	deeply	
patriarchal	and	that	gendered	violence	 is	rife	 in	 those	regions	(Perveen	2009).	 It	may	also	be	
true	that	the	majority	of	Australian	society	is	not	overtly	patriarchal	and	equality	for	women	has	
come	 far	 enough	 to	 generate	 deep	disapproval	 of	 sexual	 violence	 (even	 in	 those	 cases	where	
victims	have	been	traditionally	blamed).	Yet	the	fact	that	Sully	can	allude	to	the	possibility	that	




American	 legal	 scholar	 Leti	 Volpp	 (2001)	 has	 suggested	 that	 a	 focus	 on	 the	 sexism	 of	 other	
cultures	obscures	the	extent	of	sexism	and	gendered	violence	in	the	dominant	culture.	While,	as	
Anne	 Phillips	 (2007)	 argues,	 it	 may	 not	 be	 tenable	 to	 suggest	 that	 all	 societies	 are	 equally	
patriarchal	or	 that	 some	societies	do	not	have	 a	more	 robust	 agenda	of	 equality	between	 the	
sexes,	 this	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 an	 agenda,	 however	 marginalised	 it	 might	 be	 in	 these	 Other	
societies,	simply	does	not	exist.		
	
Overall,	 Sully’s	 assumptions	 do	 not	 account	 for	 the	 heterogeneity	 of	 either	 Australian	 or	
Pakistani	 society;	 indeed	 none	 of	 the	 judicial	 commentary	 in	 the	 K	 brothers’	 trials	 explicitly	




such	 as	 the	 Australian	 Defence	 Force	 (Australian	 Human	 Rights	 Commission	 (AHRC)	 Report	
2012)	 (and	 other	 Defence	 Forces,	 for	 example,	 Fowler	 et	 al.’s	 (2003)	 Report	 of	 the	 Panel	 to	
Review	Sexual	Misconduct	Allegations	at	 the	U.S.	Air	Force	Academy),	 elite	Australian	 sporting	
teams	 (Cover	 2013;	 Flood	 2008;	 Philadelphoff‐Puren	 2004),	 the	 Catholic	 Church	
(Commonwealth	 of	 Australia	 (2014)	 Royal	 Commission	 into	 Institutional	 Responses	 to	 Child	
Sexual	Abuse)	and	college	 fraternities	 (Sanday	2007	 in	a	US	context)	have	been	the	subject	of	
heightened	 public	 and	 political	 attention	 and	 debate	 in	 an	 Australian	 and	 in	 other	 Western	
contexts.	 In	ways	unprecedented,	recent	discourse	has	at	times	moved	beyond	the	 ‘bad	apple’	







Yet	 there	 remains	 a	 significant	 difference	 between	 the	 stigma	 attached	 to	 the	 sexual	
transgressions	of	institutional	groups	on	the	one	hand	and	ethnic	cultural	groups	on	the	other.	
One	 notable	 difference	 is	 the	 perception	 that	 non‐Western	 ethnic	 cultural	 groups	 are	
intransigent,	 trapped	 in	 a	 pre‐modern	 moral	 universe	 and	 beyond	 positive	 change,	 while	
Western	institutional	cultures	are	smaller	in	scale,	retain	at	least	some	level	of	authority	(even	
after	 the	 exposure	 of	 repugnant	 practices)	 and	 are	 deemed	 capable	 of	 reform.	 Another	
distinction	 lies	 in	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 stigma	attached	 to	 institutional	 cultures	and	non‐Western	





The	 legal	 subject	 as	 an	 autonomous,	 rational	 agent	 –	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 citizen	 subject	 of	
liberalism	 –	 is	 one	 that	 has	 long	 been	 contested	 by	 feminists	 of	 various	 persuasions.	 The	




diversity,	 structurally	 disadvantaged	 or	marginalised	 populations	 and	 a	 politics	 of	 difference	
have	 raised	 similar	 objections	 to	 the	 premises	 of	 sameness	 that	 animate	 concepts	 of	 liberal	
citizenship	(Razack	1999;	Sandel	1982;	Tully	1995;	Young	1990)	and	legal	personhood	(Naffine	
1990).	 In	 such	work,	 the	 insights	 of	 feminism	 centred	 on	 the	 exclusion	 of	women	 have	 been	
mobilised	to	criticise	the	exclusion	of	other	group	identities	through	universalised	liberal	claims	
to	citizenship	(and	similarly,	legal	subjectivity)	that	purport	to	be	neutral	but	are	based	on	the	
white,	 male,	 privileged	 and	 autonomous	 subject	 that	 is	 said	 to	 remain	 detached	 from	 the	
parochial	 and	 irrational	 demands	 of	 cultural	 and	 group	 identities.	 As	 Savell	 points	 out	 (with	
reference	to	Mykitiuk	1994),	‘the	legal	person	is	characterised	as	a	self‐sufficient,	self‐directing	
agent	whose	relations	with	others	are	antagonistic’	(2002:	31).3	Moreover,	critics	of	liberalism	
question	 the	 possibility	 of	 justice	 in	 a	 society	 based	 on	 a	 fiction	 of	 neutrality.	 For	 example,	
Sandel	maintains	that	 ‘all	political	orders	…	embody	some	values;	the	question	is	whose	values	
prevail	 and	 who	 gains	 and	 loses	 as	 a	 result	 …	 [T]he	 ideal	 of	 a	 society	 governed	 by	 neutral	




quo	 often	 offers	 answers	 through	 an	 acknowledgment	 of	 the	 difference	 and	 differential	
circumstances	 of	 diverse	 and	 subordinated	 groups.	 As	 Phillips	 points	 out	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	
feminist	analysis:	 ‘In	the	framework	of	an	unequal	society,	 that	refusal	to	recognise	difference	
can	have	perverse	effects	…	 [it]	 can	become	a	covert	way	of	elevating	one	group	alone	as	 the	
norm.	Men	then	stand	in	for	humanity,	and	humanity	adopts	a	masculine	form’	(2002:	16).	The	
same	might	be	said	in	the	context	of	race	and	class	as	the	(male)	legal	subject	finds	its	origins	
within	 and	 is	 articulated	 from	 a	 certain	 structural	 standpoint	 that	 is	 presumed	 universal.	
According	to	Naffine,	the	legal	subject	is	‘the	white,	educated,	affluent	male…	[who]	evinces	the	
style	 of	 masculinity	 of	 the	 middle	 classes’	 (1990:	 100‐101)	 while	 Hudson	 points	 to	 ‘the	




There	have	been	 two	key	approaches	 in	 recognising	difference	 to	avoid	uncritically	accepting	
the	 privileged	 (white,	 male,	 affluent)	 status	 of	 the	 legal	 person.	 One	 is	 the	 progressively	
intentioned	 cross‐cultural	 ‘recognition’	 approach	 that	 generally	 prevails	 in	 communitarian	
scholarship	and	 in	cultural	defences	 in	 law,	where	cultural	group	 identities	risk	being	seen	as	





approach	 goes	 in	 the	 opposite	 direction,	 seeking	 to	 avoid	 this	 fixed	 and	 essentialist	 view	 of	
culture	by	denying	the	existence	of	a	group	identity	at	all.	Stuart	Hall	takes	this	position	in	‘New	
Ethnicities’	when	he	states	that	 ‘the	 fully	unified,	completed,	secure	and	coherent	 identity	 is	a	
fantasy’	 (1992:	 277).	 Such	 views,	 taken	 to	 the	 extreme,	 deny	 the	 coherence	 of	 group	 and	
cultural	identities	and	may	even	disavow	the	labeling	of	cultural	groups.	As	a	result,	the	politics	
of	 difference	 ends	 up	 converging,	 somewhat,	 with	 the	 individualistic	 stance	 associated	 with	




…	 the	 ‘ethnic	 minority’,	 like	 the	 ‘Aboriginal	 people’	 or	 ‘the	 lesbian	 and	 gay	
community’,	is	made	up	of	women	and	men,	old	and	young,	rich	and	poor:	people	
often	 engaged	 in	 conflict	 and	 disagreeing	 about	 the	 interpretation	 of	 their	
supposedly	shared	culture.	(2002:	24)	
	
Put	 differently,	 structural	 realities	 constrain	 the	 choices	 of	 individuals	 from	 ethnic	 minority	
groups	 in	 the	 same	ways	 as	 they	 do	 for	 individuals	 from	 any	 other	 group,	 but	 that	 does	 not	
mean	 that	 the	 moral	 and	 political	 agency	 to	 resist	 and	 contest	 objectionable	 and	 outmoded	
cultural	values	or	practices	is	simply	absent.		
	
Going	back	 to	 the	 legal	examples	presented	 in	 the	K	brothers’	cases,	 it	 is	clear	 that	 failures	to	
account	 for	 heterogeneity,	 difference	 and	 contestation	within	 cultures	 and	 cultural	 identities	
(rather	 than	 only	 between	 cultures)	 highlight	 two	 important	 points.	 Firstly,	 it	 is	 easy	 to	




What	 is	 a	 culture	 and	 how	 do	 you	 know?	 A	 Chinese	 immigrant	 murders	 his	
supposedly	unfaithful	wife	and	says	this	is	the	way	we	do	things	back	home	...	The	
cultural	 rights	 argument	 works	 best	 for	 cultures	 that	 most	 Americans	 [or	
Australians]	know	comparatively	 little	about:	 cultures	 that	 in	 our	 ignorance	we	




individual	 identity.	 This	 ensures	 that	 the	 individual	 agency	 of	 Others	 is	 subordinated	 to	 the	



























draw	 on	 beliefs	 about	 non‐Western	 cultures	 to	 make	 a	 claim	 for	 diminished	
responsibility,	but	if	she	is	sullied	by	past	sexual	encounters	or	over‐qualified	by	





women	across	 the	Western	world,	echoing	also	 the	anthropological	portrayal	of	all	women	 in	
NWFP	as	 ‘legal	minors’	 (Odgers	2005)	 in	MSK’s	 sentencing	 appeal	 submissions.	 Interestingly,	
the	 stereotypes	 that	 abound	 around	 men	 and	 women	 of	 the	 dominant	 culture	 carry	 similar	
weight	in	legal	determinations	within	intimate	partner	homicide	and	provocation	cases	where	
culture	 is	 not	 specifically	 invoked	 (see	 Maher	 et	 al.	 2005).	 Such	 cases	 trade	 on	 either	 the	
diminished	 responsibility	 or	 otherwise	 of	 female	 defendants,	 and	 the	 perception	 of	 men	 as	
‘understandably	 incensed	by	 the	 sexual	waywardness	of	 “their”	women’	 (Phillips	2003:	530).	
This	leads	Phillips	to	conclude	that	the	culture	of	Others	is	accommodated	to	the	extent	that	it	
‘fits	 into	 familiar	 patterns	 …	 Culture	 operates	 on	 a	 terrain	 already	 defined	 by	 mainstream	
gender	 assumptions,	 and	 the	 gender	 inequities	 that	 have	 been	 associated	 with	 the	 cultural	
defence	need	to	be	understood	within	this	context’	(2003:	530‐531).		
	
Phillips’	 observations	 highlight	 the	 fact	 that	 cultural	 influence	 underpins	 individual	 violent	
transgressions	 across	 all	 cultures,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 the	 cultural	 backdrop	 is	 rendered	
invisible	through	its	taken‐for‐granted,	hegemonic	status,	or	highly	visible	in	its	Otherness.	It	is	
just	that	individual	agency	appears	to	either	be	conferred	or	taken	away	from	individuals	who	
come	 before	 the	 courts	 in	 line	 with	 their	 gender	 and	 cultural	 difference.	 In	 the	 examples	
outlined	in	this	paper,	a	dichotomous	approach	emerges	in	which	the	offenders	are	either	seen	
as	 individual	agents,	 fully	responsible	 for	 their	actions	because	 they	were	deemed	sufficiently	
versed	in	the	(non‐sexist)	norms	of	Australian	society,	or	they	were	irrational	dupes	who	were	
blindly	 conditioned	 by	 the	 dictates	 of	 a	 culture	 that	 remains	 timeless	 in	 its	 oppression	 of	
women.	While	the	successful	persuasion	of	the	courts	by	the	latter	argument	may	suit	racialised	
defendants	for	the	purposes	of	securing	a	more	lenient	sentence,	it	constitutes	a	denial	of	their	
subjectivity	 as	 free	 agents	 while	 entrenching	 damaging	 cultural	 stereotypes	 more	 widely.	
Dominant	 and	 reductive	 understandings	 of	 a	 cultural	 Other	 which	 are	 mobilised	 in	 law	 to	
explain	criminal	behaviours	reinforce	the	liberal/illiberal,	civilised/uncivilised	dichotomies	that	
characterise	 conservative	 arguments	 about	non‐white	 immigration,	 selective	multiculturalism	
and	anti‐Muslim	racism.		
	
It	 is	worth	also	 raising	questions	about	 the	 status	of	 defences	or	 assessments	on	 the	basis	of	
‘good	character’.	For	example,	how	is	an	offender’s	commitment	to	education	and	employment	
viewed	 by	 the	 courts	 and	 could	 these	 factors	 be	 seen	 as	 driven	 by	 culture?	 In	 one	 of	 the	
judgments	 relating	 to	 the	K	brothers’	 cases,	 Justice	Sully	 commented,	 in	his	 sentencing	of	 the	
youngest	 brother	 MRK,	 on	 ‘the	 promise	 shown	 by	 MRK	 in	 attaining	 his	 HSC	 [Higher	 School	
Certificate]	 in	 such	unpromising	 circumstances’	 (Sully	 2004	 at	 175).	 Since	MRK’s	 educational	




The	 point	 is	 that	 all	 defences	 and	 character	 assessments	 are	 in	 fact	 informed	 by	 culture.	We	







the	 maximum	 possible	 penalty.	 While	 this	 paper	 has	 not	 sought	 to	 comment	 on	 whether	
maximum	penalties	should	be	imposed	on	all	sex	offenders	(or	indeed	anyone	who	perpetrates	
violence	against	vulnerable	groups),	 there	 is	 little	point	 in	eliminating	culture	as	a	potentially	
mitigating	 factor	when	 a	multitude	 of	 other	mitigating	 factors	 are	 raised	 in	 law	 that	 are	 not	
labelled	as	 ‘cultural’.	Whether	these	factors	are	raised	opportunistically	or	otherwise	is	beside	
the	point:	 factors	of	mitigation	must	be	 considered	 in	any	democratic	 justice	 system.	What	 is	
problematic	 is	 the	 way	 in	 which	 culture	 is	 exclusively	 associated	 with	 racialised	 individuals	




A	 more	 measured	 approach	 might	 be	 for	 legal	 and	 judicial	 narratives	 to	 acknowledge	 that	
people’s	 choices	 are	 both	 constrained	 and	 enabled	 by	 any	 cultural	 framework	 that	 affords	
differential	 power	 to	 individuals	 within	 different	 structural	 circumstances.	 Cultural	 attitudes	




in	 these	 examples,	 on	 Australian	 culture	 (rather	 than	 not	mentioning	 it	 at	 all)	 in	 contrast	 to	
Other	cultures.	Those	who	identify	with	a	particular	ethnic	culture	lead	more	complex	lives	than	
that	 which	 is	 assumed	 in	 legal	 and	 political	 discourses.	 Individuals	 identifying	 with	 foreign	

















Returning	 to	 MSK	 as	 an	 example,	 his	 choices	 may	 be	 seen	 as	 influenced	 by	 a	 confluence	 of	
cultures;	 a	 patriarchal	 culture,	 whether	 that	 is	 the	 culture	 of	 his	 birthplace	 in	 NWFP	 or	 the	


















While	 there	 are	no	easy	 solutions	 that	might	 generate	a	more	nuanced	perception	of	 cultural	
difference	before	 the	courts,	 a	more	palatable	approach	 to	 cultural	defence	might	be	 taken	 in	
two	potential	ways.	First,	 a	more	 reflexive	approach	 to	 culture	might	need	 to	be	 taken	 in	 the	
commentary	 of	 judicial	 officers	 and	 other	 legal	 actors	 in	 sexual	 assault	 and	 other	 gendered	
violence	 cases.	 Granted	 that	 some	 cultural	 frameworks	may	 be	more	patriarchal	 than	others,	








Legal	 and	 judicial	 recognition	of	 the	 complexities	 that	mark	 individual	 lives	might	prompt	an	
important	 change	 in	 the	narratives	 that	pertain	 to	 cultural	Others.	Rather	 than	subordinating	
cultural	difference	to	an	invisible	and	hegemonic	cultural	norm,	this	type	of	recognition	would	
be	more	 amenable	 to	 understanding	 that	perpetrators	of	 sexual	 and	other	 gendered	 violence	
share	 a	 culture	 of	 misogyny	 that	 does	 not	 vary	 greatly	 between	 ethnicities	 and	 religious	













sort	 of	 agenda	 may	 be	 useful	 in	 relation	 to	 Indigenous	 cultural	 defence	 claims	 in	 cases	 of	
extreme	 violence	 against	women	 and	 children	 in	 remote	 Australian‐Indigenous	 communities.	
While	this	suggestion	might	attract	criticism	for	its	utopian	and	potentially	impractical	nature,	it	
seeks	 to	address	the	problem	of	minorities	within	minorities,	namely	women	and	children,	as	
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